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Abstract We investigated mental representations of body 
parts and body-related activities in two subjects with congenitally 
absent limbs (one with, the other without phantom 
sensations), a wheelchair sports group of paraplegic participants, 
and two groups of participants with intact limbs. To 
analyse mental representation structures, we applied Structure 
Dimensional Analysis. Verbal labels indicating body 
parts and related activities were presented in randomized 
lists that had to be sorted according to a hierarchical splitting 
paradigm. Participants were required to group the 
items according to whether or not they were considered 
related, based on their own body perception. Results of the 
groups of physically intact and paraplegic participants 
revealed separate clusters for the lower body, upper body, 
Wngers and head. The participant with congenital phantom 
limbs also showed a clear separation between upper and 
lower body (but not between Wngers and hands). In the 
participant without phantom sensations of the absent arms, 
no such modularity emerged, but the speciWc practice of his 
right foot in communication and daily routines was 
reXected. Sorting verbal labels of body parts and activities 
appears a useful method to assess body representation in 
individuals with special body anatomy or function and 
leads to conclusions largely compatible with other assessment 
procedures. 
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Introduction 
The topic of body representations and their classification has long stirred vivid discussions. 
Terms such as “body schema” and “body image” have been used by many authors since the 
beginning of the 20th century, mostly based on neurological patient studies (for review, see 
Corradi-Dell’Aqua and Rumiati 2007). Head and Holmes (1911) originally defined body 
schema as a dynamic model of one’s own actual posture. Later authors emphasized the 
importance to differentiate between body schema and body image, with the former being a 
postural body frame mainly based on proprioception, and the latter a predominately visually 
informed, conscious representation of the body. This dyadic taxonomy has been developed 
based on evidence from different levels (e.g., Gallagher 2005; Paillard 1999; Dijkermann and 
de Haan 2007), and has been used by several authors in a rather non-unitary way (see de 
Vignemont, 2010). In addition, triadic taxonomies have been presented, for example by 
Sirigu et al. (1991), who distinguished the sensorimotor body schema from a visuo-spatial 
body structural description and conceptual body semantics. In order to demonstrate a triple 
dissociation between body schema, body structural description and body image based on 
data from neurological patients, Schwoebel and Coslett (2005) tested stroke patients in 
specific tasks for each type of body representation (body schema: imagery, hand laterality; 
body structural description: localization; body image: functional matching). Results showed a 
dissociation between the three suggested categories, but also a double dissociation between 
the two body schema tasks. Based on behavioural and neurological data, the authors 
concluded that knowledge about the human body consists of functionally dissociable 
representations. Evidence for neural correlates of different types of body representations has 
also been obtained in brain imaging studies (e.g., Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2008, 2009; see 
also Berlucchi and Aglioti, 2010).  
Giummarra et al. (2007) emphasize the role of body schema in generating actions, 
suggesting that proprioceptive, somatosensory, vestibular and visual systems as well as the 
motor system including efference copies provide the major contributions to its properties. 
These authors also point to the predominant role of the parietal cortex, especially the 
superior parietal lobule, the temporo-parietal junction and parieto-insular connections, in 
generating the body schema, and in mapping peripersonal space in egocentric frames of 
reference, i.e. relative to one's own body or parts of it. De Vignemont (2010) also 
emphasizes the action-related character of the concept of body schema and proposes to 
define it based on its function in action guidance.  
In order to provide meaningful criteria for the clarification of the concept of body schema, 
Haggard and Wolpert (2005) have defined body schema as the “central representation of the 
body’s spatial properties, that includes the length of limb segments, their hierarchical 
arrangement, the configuration of the segments in space and the shape of the body surface”. 
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According to Haggard and Wolpert (2005), this central representation is characterized by 
seven main properties. They describe body schema as spatially coded, modular (i.e., 
integrating different schemata, e.g. for upper and lower extremities), continuously updated 
with movement, adaptable to changes in properties of the body and body parts, supramodal, 
coherent, and interpersonal. The latter characteristic, interpersonality, suggests a close 
integration of interoceptive information of one’s own body and the visual perception of the 
bodies of others. In an earlier review, Berlucchi and Aglioti (1997) argued that body schema 
also involves mnemonic and imaginative components.  
Based on evidence from numerous studies that showed physical activity and activity 
observed in others to share common neural correlates (e.g., Sebanz et al. 2003; Grèzes and 
Dècety 2001), Funk et al. (2005) referred to body schema as multimodal representation of 
the body that explicitly includes the aspect of visual influence of observed human body 
dynamics, which is likely to play an important role in the generation of phantom limbs. 
Phantom sensations in amputees have been described as being caused by persisting activity 
in neural network components after the loss of a body part, and the erroneous integration of 
this activity in the generation of a contingent body schema (Berlucchi and Aglioti 1997). 
Aplasic phantoms perceived by persons with congenitally missing limbs have been reported 
by several authors, and different theories regarding their genesis have been put forward (see 
Brugger and Funk 2007; Hilti and Brugger, in press). One theory presented by Price (2006) 
takes different prenatal and postnatal factors into account, including muscle activity and 
sensory and proprioceptive feedback in utero, visual experience of observing intact limb 
movements in other persons, and prosthesis usage in early life. Based on Berlucchi and 
Aglioti (1997), Giummarra et al. (2007) noted that “the brain may be genetically predisposed 
to represent a prototypical human body, regardless of the correspondence or lack thereof 
between the ideal model and the actual body”. They state that phantom limb sensations in 
subjects with congenitally absent limbs may evolve from the habitual observation of limb 
movements in other people and the continued activation of an innate boy schema. These 
authors thus significantly extended earlier, more anecdotal, notions of a genetic basis of 
congenital phantom limbs (Abramson and Feibel 1981). 
The present study set out to analyze mental representations of body parts and related 
activities in two subjects with congenitally missing limbs. One of these individuals, A.Z., was 
born without forearms and legs, and perceived phantoms of all four limbs as long as she can 
remember. She also frequently uses these phantoms actively to imagine and simulate 
movements (Brugger et al. 2000). The other individual, C.L., is also born without hands and 
arms, and has two shortened legs with only one functionally intact  foot. Importantly, C.L. has 
never experienced any phantom sensations.  
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Previous behavioural studies have revealed significant differences between these two 
individuals (Funk et al. 2005, Funk and Brugger 2008). These differences suggested that 
phantom sensations of limbs that have never been physically experienced can serve as a 
substrate for motor activity and related perceptual effects in the same way as the lifelong use 
of physically intact limbs.  
Specifically, results of behavioural experiments in which A.Z. and C.L. had been compared to 
control subjects with intact bodies provide a valuable backround for the present study. These 
results were interpreted as evidence for the experience of phantom limbs constraining both 
dynamic and static visual limb observation as much as sensorimotor experiences with real 
limbs. In a study of apparent limb motion (Shiffrar and Freyd 1990), A.Z. showed a pattern of 
results comparable to normally-limbed controls (Funk et al. 2005; Brugger and Funk 2007). 
In a mental rotation task with hand stimuli, A.Z. showed prolonged reaction times for hands 
depicted in rotation angles corresponding to awkward postures (Parsons 1994), whereas C.L 
did not show this effect (Funk and Brugger 2008). In an implicit reaching task (Cooper and 
Shepard 1975; Parsons et al. 1995), A.Z., like intact-limbed control subjects, showed 
significantly longer reaction times in trials that involved mental rotation than in the other trials 
(Brugger et al. 2000). The behavioural experiments were complemented by neuroimaging 
techniques; specifically, A.Z.’s phantom limb awareness was investigated using fMRI and 
TMS (Brugger et al. 2000). Brain areas that were active during A.Z.’s movements of her 
phantom fingers and hands included the bilateral dorsal premotor cortex, supplementary 
motor area, superior parietal cortex, but not the primary motor and primary somatosensory 
areas of handrepresentation. In the TMS study, stimulation of areas in the premotor and 
parietal cortex elicited slow movement sensations of the contralateral fingers and hand, but 
typically from a much larger area of the cortex than in healthy subjects. Together, these 
results elucidated A.Z.’s cognitive and neural correlates of phantom sensations and 
confirmed the reality of congenital phantoms over and beyond the mere phenomenal 
We also investigated a group of paraplegic subjects and two groups of subjects with 
physically intact bodies, differing in their level of physical activity: a group if sports students 
and a control group (matched to A.Z and C.L in age and occupation). The SDA method 
(Structure Dimensional Analysis; Lander and Lange 1996; Schack 2004a, 2010) has 
previously been applied to investigate mental representations of complex movements in the 
long term memory of athletes (e.g., Schack and Mechsner 2006) and dancers (Bläsing et al. 
2009). Our aim was to investigate how different physical conditions, including the rare case 
of congenital phantoms, and resulting modes of physical activity would shape cognitive body 
representation. De Vignemont (2010) has put forward that body schema is exploited by the 
motor system at different stages of action programming, action prediction and sensory 
feedback to inform forward and inverse models in the motor control system. In accordance 
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with this view, our perspective is based on the assumption that the multimodal information 
used for the learning of complex movements also underlies the updating of an action-based 
body representation. 
 
Methods 
Subjects 
We tested two individuals, A.Z. and C.L., who were both born with incomplete arms and legs, 
a group of participants of recreational wheelchair sports teams and two groups of physically 
intact subjects (see Table 1). A.Z. (aged 54 at the time of the study) has been born with 
tetramelia and perceived phantoms of all four limbs as long as she can remember. Due to 
this rare condition, A.Z has taken part in several previous studies (Brugger et al. 2000; 
Brugger and Funk 2007; Funk et al. 2005; Funk and Brugger 2008). C.L. (aged 45 at the time 
of the study) has been born without arms; his legs are shortened and altered in shape (he is 
unable to walk). He uses his right foot (that is more moveable than the left one) for everyday 
activities such as grasping objects, writing with a pen, drinking from a cup etc., as well as for 
pointing and gesturing. C.L. has never experienced any phantom limbs in his life. Like A.Z., 
he has also taken part in previous studies (Funk et al. 2005; Funk and Brugger 2008).  
Six additional participants (one woman) were recruited from among two recreational 
wheelchair sports teams (basketball and table tennis; average age: 48.5 ± 10.4 years). All of 
them were paralyzed as a consequence of accident (N=5, average age at the time of the 
accident: 20.6 ± 5.2 years) or meningitis during infancy (N=1). None of them had lost a limb 
in the accident, or had been born paralyzed or with incomplete limbs, and none of them had 
ever experienced phantom sensations. Individual conditions of sensorimotor functioning, 
carefully assessed in medical interviews, are summarized in Table 2.  
As controls, we tested two groups of participants with intact bodies, but of different age and 
physical activity level. The first group consisted of persons comparable to A.Z. and C.L. with 
respect to age and occupation (mostly university staff, N=12, 6 women; average age: 46.8 ± 
10.1 years), the other group consisted of sport students (N=18, 10 women; average age: 
24.2 ± 2.4 years).  
All participants gave their informed consent prior to their inclusion in the study. The study has 
been performed in accordance with the ethical standards of the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
***************************************************** 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
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***************************************************** 
Procedure 
Mental representations of the body were measured using SDA (Lander and Lange 1996; 
Schack, 2004a, 2010). Body parts and limb-related activities were repeatedly presented to 
the participants in randomized verbal lists. These had to be sorted according to a hierarchical 
splitting paradigm. The labels used were: eye, forehead, mouth, thumb, index finger; elbow, 
shoulder; chest, hip, knee, heel, big toe, talking, writing, pointing, walking (actual labels were 
given in German: Auge, Stirn, Mund, Daumen, Zeigefinger; Ellenbogen, Schulter; Brust, 
Hüfte, Knie, Ferse, Großzehe, reden, schreiben, zeigen, gehen). These labels are referred to 
as "concepts" henceforth. 
During the experiment, the participants were sitting in front of a laptop computer. They 
performed the splitting task by sorting the concepts presented on the screen according to 
their subjective closeness to the first item in the list, the current anchor. This anchor was 
always displayed in white font and highlighted by a red bar; the active item was displayed in 
yellow font and the remaining concepts in black font. Participants were explicitly instructed to 
rely on the perception of their own body when making their decisions. Concepts which the 
participant judged to be “closely related” to the anchor were shifted to a "related list" on the 
left side of the screen, while concepts regarded as “not closely related” were shifted to an 
"unrelated list" located on the right side of the screen. After splitting a list into two sets (a 
related and an unrelated list), these two sets were displayed separately and the subjects 
could choose whether they wanted to accept or split them into further subsets. After finishing 
the splitting of each and every list, the participants were required to confirm this step by 
pressing a key to proceed. The experiment was completed after confirmation of the last list.  
Participants A.Z. and C.L. and two participants from the wheelchair sports group did not 
press the keys themselves, as all other participants did. They rather informed the 
experimenter to which of the lists they wanted an item to be sorted, whereupon the 
experimenter pressed the corresponding key. Because of these differences in data 
acquisition, decision times were not measured, and participants were informed that time did 
not matter. Irrespective of the two response modalities, it took participants approximately 30 
minutes to complete the entire experiment. 
 
SDA method 
The relational structure of the body representation was obtained by SDA (Lander and Lange 
1996, Schack 2004a, 2010). This cluster analytic method consists of four steps: First, a 
special splitting procedure involving a multiple sorting task delivers a distance scaling 
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between the concepts of a predetermined set. Second, a hierarchical cluster analysis is used 
to transform each set of concepts into a hierarchical structure. Third, a factor analysis reveals 
the dimensions in this structured set of concepts, and fourth, the cluster solutions are tested 
for invariance within and between groups. (Psychometric details of the procedure are 
provided by Schack 2001). In more global terms, the four steps of the analysis are 
characterized as follows: 
The experimental procedure started by collecting information on the representational 
distance between selected concepts (Step 1). This was achieved through the application of 
the previously described splitting technique in an experimental setting (see Procedure) in 
which participants were asked to judge the functional relationship between two concepts 
(see, e.g., Schack 2004a). Each concept (body-part) was offered as an anchor (i.e., 
reference object), to which the remaining N-1 concepts were either classified or de-classified 
according to an individually chosen similarity criterion. This procedure continued with the 
emerging (positive or negative) partial quantities by retaining the reference object (anchor) 
until an individual discontinuance criterion per participant was reached. By this procedure, N-
decision trees were established, as each concept occupied once a reference position. 
Subsequently, the algebraic branch sums were determined on the partial quantities per 
decision tree, submitted to a Z-transformation for standardization, and finally combined into a 
Z-matrix. This matrix formed the starting point of all further analyses. Hence, the SDA 
method does not ask the subjects to give explicit statements regarding their representation 
structures, but rather reveals this structure by means of knowledge-based decisions in an 
experimental setting. To guarantee that all perceptual features of the concepts are included 
in the decision process, the given method offers the possibility to explore action-based body 
representations physically and mentally in the context of the decision by performing or 
mentally simulating body movements; this is done in order to account for the inherent links 
between the motor and cognitive components of the concepts.  
To measure in a second step the hierarchical structure of representation, the Z-Matrix was 
transferred into a Euclidian distance matrix as basis for a hierarchic cluster analysis (in 
accordance with the average-linkage-method). This resulted in individual cluster solutions on 
the N-concepts formed as dendrograms. Each cluster solution was established by 
determining an incidental Euclidian distance (dkrit), with all junctures lying below this value 
forming the apical pole of an underlying concept cluster. 
For the purpose of a dimension analysis (the third step of the SDA), the Z-matrix is 
transformed into a correlation matrix, which then provides the data basis for an (orthogonal) 
factor analysis with a subsequent cluster-oriented rotation procedure. The result is a factor 
matrix classified according to the concept clusters.   
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In a fourth step, to measure inter-individual or inter-group differences between representation 
structures, the constructed individual cluster solutions were examined pair-wise for their 
structural invariance. A structural invariance measure λ was determined based on three 
defined values: the number of constructed clusters of the pair-wise cluster solutions, the 
number of elements (concepts) within the constructed clusters, and the average quantities of 
the constructed clusters. The λ value was calculated as the square root of the product of the 
weighted arithmetic means of the relative average quantities of the constructed clusters and 
the proportional number of clusters in the compared cluster solutions. In the present analysis, 
a differential threshold was defined as λ0=0.68 (i.e., two structures were declared invariant if 
they possessed a λ value higher than λ0; note that λ0 value is not a statistical probability 
value, but a critical value). As a result of the invariance analysis, an invariance matrix was 
established to indicate the similarity between the representation structures of the different 
groups and/or individuals (for more detailed information on the method, see Schack 2001, 
2010). 
 
Results 
Results of the hierarchical cluster analysis (α=1%, dcrit=4.59) via SDA method are 
summarized in Table 3, displayed as dendrograms in Figure 1, and further illustrated in 
Figure 2.  
The group dendrogram of the age-matched control group features four clusters (Figure 1A). 
The first cluster contains concepts of body parts of the head (eye, mouth, forehead) together 
with the activity talking. The second cluster contains concepts of body parts of the trunk 
(chest, shoulder). The third cluster contains concepts of body parts of the hand (thumb, index 
finger) together with the activity writing. The fourth cluster contains concepts of body parts of 
the lower limb (big toe, heel, knee and hip) together with the activity walking. The concepts 
elbow and pointing have been singled out, which means that they were connected to other 
concepts above the significance level.  
The cluster solution of the group of sport students (Figure 1B) differs slightly from the one of 
the control group. It also shows four clusters that relate to body parts of the head, hand 
(fingers), upper limb and lower limb. A difference to the cluster solution of the control group 
occurs in the third cluster that in this case relates to body parts of the upper limb rather than 
the trunk, with shoulder and elbow being included and chest being singled out. Unlike in the 
control group, the concept pointing is included in the finger cluster. 
The group of participants in wheelchairs (Figure 1C) has produced a cluster solution that 
shows only small differences from that of the group of sport students: the head cluster is 
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separated into two clusters of two concepts each, consisting of eye and forehead, and mouth 
and talking.  
In the cluster solution of A.Z. (Figure 1D), the head is also represented in two clusters, the 
first consisting of the concepts eye and writing, the second mouth and talking. The third 
cluster contains the concepts shoulder and chest, the fourth elbow, thumb, and index finger. 
The fifth cluster consists of the body parts of the lower limb, hip, knee, big toe, heel, and 
walking. The concepts forehead and pointing are singled out.  
The cluster solution produced by C.L. (Figure 1E) consists of three clusters that differ largely 
from the clusters produced by A.Z. and the other participant groups, with no separation 
between upper and lower limb concepts. The largest cluster contains the concepts forehead, 
mouth, chest, big toe, talking, pointing and writing. The second cluster contains eye and 
shoulder and the third cluster index finger, hip and walking. The concepts heel, knee, thumb 
and elbow are singled out.  
 
***************************************************** 
Insert Table 3 and Figures 1 and 2 about here 
 ***************************************************** 
 
Results of the invariance analysis between groups show that none of the cluster solutions 
are invariant from each other, all λ values are below λ0=.68. In the following, we compare the 
cluster solutions for similarity based on their structural invariance values. The results of the 
control group and of the sport students’ group show a high similarity (λ=0.57) and so do the 
results of the sport students and those of the wheelchair group (λ=0.61). A.Z.'s results are 
slightly more similar to those of the control group (λ=0.48) than are C.L.'s results (λ=0.44) 
and those of the wheelchair group (λ=0.41). The results of A.Z. and C.L. show the lowest 
structural similarity (λ=0.36).  
 
Discussion 
The results of our study reveal different cluster solutions for all five groups or individuals, 
respectively. Even though none of the cluster solutions are invariant from each other, the 
qualitative differences between the cluster solutions are striking especially when regarded in 
the context of the physical conditions and modes of activity of the experimental subjects. 
level. 
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Modularity of body representation  
The cluster solutions of the two groups of physically intact persons and those of the 
wheelchair group resemble each other, with one cluster for the lower limbs including the 
activity walking, one cluster for the fingers and manual activities, one cluster (separated into 
two in the wheelchair group) for the head and talking, and one cluster for the trunk and upper 
limbs. Such modularity has been proposed by Haggard and Wolpert (2005) as one of the 
main characteristics of body schema. By modularity, the authors understand the fact that 
different body parts are represented in different neural circuits and organized in a modular 
network to represent postures of the whole body. One of the most distinctive features of this 
modularity is the separation between upper and lower body in body schema (Reed and 
Farah 1995). In the wheelchair group, this modularity still exists even though in these 
participants, the functionality of the lower part of their bodies has been severely impaired for 
a long time (see Table 2: 31±4.1 years since incident, i.e. since youth and in one case even 
since early childhood – note that the cluster solution of the latter individual did not show 
decreased modularity compared to the other participants). Interestingly, a separation 
between upper and lower body was also reflected in A.Z.'s cluster solution, even though she 
completely lacks lower body parts (knee, heel, big toe, walking) and has no forearms, hands 
and fingers. In this respect, applying the concept of a modular body schema according to 
Haggard and Wolpert (2005) and conclusions drawn from them regarding our results, we 
interpret A.Z.’s modular body representation, especially her upper/lower limb modularity, as a 
consequence of her vivid and enduring phantom limbs.  
In contrast to the subjects with intact functional hands, A.Z. did not show a common cluster 
for thumb, index finger, and related activities, despite of her phantom hands and fingers that 
otherwise displayed various characteristics of intact hands (Brugger et al. 2000; Hilti and 
Brugger, in press). This finding can be interpreted in the context of the idea of a distinct 
finger schema as it has been proposed by Benton (1959) and corroborated by clinical studies 
of finger agnosia (e.g., Kinsbourne and Warrington 1962, Anema et al. 2008). Haggard et al. 
(2006) have found experimental evidence for a somatotopic representation of the fingers 
different from the body schema in which the hand as a whole is represented. The latter is 
based on external spatial locations that are updated during body movements (Haggard and 
Wolpert 2005), whereas the finger schema relies on somatotopic skin space. This could 
account for an explanation why the differentiation of hand module and finger module does 
not occur in A.Z.’s results: while her congenital phantoms may provide her with a complete 
body schema that includes all four limbs, the absence of tactile afferences from her fingers 
would prevent her from developing a dissociable finger schema.  
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Deviation from modular body representation 
C.L., who, in contrast to A.Z, has never experienced any phantom sensations, shows a 
structure that deviates largely from the modular structure found in the cluster solutions of the 
groups. In C.L.’s cluster solution, the concept big toe is integrated with concepts of the head 
and upper body (mouth, forehead, chest) and activity concepts related to head and hand 
(talking, writing, pointing). This conceptualisation of the big toe is consistent with C.L.’s 
specific way of using his right foot for “manual” and communicative activities, such as writing 
and gesturing. It can therefore be argued, that C.L.’s cluster solution clearly represents his 
action-based body representation shaped by his personal way of using his body parts for 
actions, especially by the application of his right foot as a functional hand. This result brings 
to mind that adaptability, additional to modularity, is another main characteristic of body 
schema proposed by Haggard and Wolpert (2005). This feature relates to gradual changes in 
spatial properties, such as changes in the size of body parts over life time, or adaptation to 
loss of body parts. In C.L.’s case, adaptability – in terms of a functional adaptation to his 
bodily condition and use of body parts – seems to have the potential to override modularity. 
Interestingly, this was not the case for the participants of the wheelchair group, whose bodily 
functionality has been rather reduced than fundamentally changed. It appears that neither 
extensive exercise (as in the sports students) nor paraplegia or non-functionality of whole 
body parts (as in the wheelchair group) has the potential to modify the modular body 
representation, whereas a qualitative functional switch in the use of body parts (as in C.L.) 
has this potential. We see this result as evidence for a strong interaction of action-based and 
conceptual body representations on a functional level – a view that is not consistent with the 
notion of completely separable body schema and body image and/or body structural 
description. It could be argued that, in this respect, C.L.’s cluster solution that integrates 
index finger with concepts of the lower body, hip and walking, seems somehow inconsistent. 
When asked about this result, however, C.L. commented that, in his personal reference, the 
label index finger corresponds to his second toe, whereas the label big toe refers to his real 
big toe that he actually uses as thumb (note that the concept thumb had been singled out).  
In favour of the view that an action-based body representation should not only involve the 
coding of one’s own actual body posture, but also the long-term representation of one’s own 
body, Carruthers (2008a,b) suggests to distinguish between “online” and “offline” 
representations of the body that mutually influence each other, with online representations 
informing offline representations and offline representations providing a framework for the 
construction of online representations. This is supported by Gazzola et al. (2007), whose 
brain imaging study revealed that aplasic subjects missing both hands activated brain areas 
involved in mouth or foot movements when watching hand actions. As the experimental task 
applied in our study involves offline rather than online representations, the results give some 
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evidence for C.L.’s, but not A.Z.’s, body representation reflecting an influence of online 
representations of his actual and acting physical body.  
Recent studies by de Vignemont et al. (2009) provide evidence that body representation 
might already be structured into categorical body parts on the level of tactile integration. 
Their results corroborate the view of de Vignemont et al. (2005), who have suggested two 
different types of body mereology, a somatosensory one that relies on body part categories 
separated by joints acting as category boundaries, and a motor mereology that relies on 
motor synergies in which the boundary effect is reduced by action. The authors suggest that 
the relative overestimation of cross-joint distances observed in their study arises partly from 
perceptual categorisation of body parts, which means that categorisation effects influence 
perception at an early level in the processing of tactile stimuli. Regarding C.L.’s body 
representation and apparent inconsistency of his subjective way of labelling his second toe 
as “index finger” and his big toe (his functional thumb) as “big toe” rather than “thumb”, it 
would be interesting to investigate how, in C.L. and persons with similar bodily conditions, 
body part concepts are modulated due to individual use and activity, and how this might 
influence tactile and proprioceptive perception. 
Measuring body representations via SDA 
As the paradigm used here relies on verbal (or, in other studies, pictorial) labels, it could be 
argued that, using such a method to trigger body representations, we could not get access to 
the level of action-related body schema but exclusively to the level of body structural 
description or body image (Sirigu et al. 1991; Schwoebel and Coslett 2005). Regarding this 
issue, it has to be explained why we assume that the method we used does have the 
potential to give us, at least partly, access to the memory structures that underlie limb motor 
actions rather that to mere semantic knowledge. 
The SDA method has previously been applied for analysing cognitive structures in long term 
memory, for example in studies of movement expertise in athletes (e.g., Schack 2004a; 
Schack and Mechsner 2006) and dancers (Bläsing et al. 2009), in rehabilitation studies 
(Braun et al. 2007), as well as in studies of other types of expert knowledge (Schack 2004b). 
The split procedure as integral part of the SDA method represents a psychometric approach 
to determine individual proximity measures. Proximity data are acquired successively by 
multilateral, multiple sorting of items, which allows for an extremely fine grading in proximity 
scaling. In a study by Reed et al. (2004), a sorting task was applied in which cards with 
pictures of human body parts had to be assigned to two, three, four and a free number of 
categories. In contrast to the SDA’s hierarchical splitting process that is based on multiple 
pair-wise comparisons, subjects in the study by Reed et al. (2004) performed only one 
sorting procedure for the whole stimulus set per instruction. Furthermore, in Reed’s study, 
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the number of categories was mostly given in the instructions and therefore influenced the 
participants’ sorting process, whereas in SDA, the number of clusters solely depends on the 
participant’s pair-wise sorting behaviour in order to avoid a strong top-down influence of 
superordinate concepts. In this respect, we argue that the method applied by Reed et al. 
(2004) facilitates a third-person-view and decisions based on declarative knowledge 
structures and thereby addresses general body semantics to a much stronger extent than the 
SDA method does.  
Studies of movement expertise (e.g., Schack and Mechsner 2006; Bläsing et al. 2009) have 
shown that the SDA sorting procedure is well suited to reveal long term memory structures 
that are not exclusively declarative, like movement knowledge. Even though based on verbal 
labels, we argue that this method is more appropriate to address action-based body 
concepts than commonly applied approaches to body structural description or body image. 
Body structural description has often been associated with tasks such as pointing towards 
own body parts or corresponding body parts in pictures, however, this approach has been 
criticised by de Vignemont (2010), who argues that such pointing tasks are likely to involve 
different types of body representation and body-related spatial frames of reference in 
parallel. Previous studies (e.g., Schack et al. 2004a) have shown that increasing motor 
expertise brings about increased differentiation of body postures. These studies investigated 
mental representations of functional movement structures, i.e., body parts were implicitly 
represented according to their movement-based functionality. In the current study, body 
structure is addressed directly, but in the context of action. In order to facilitate the access to 
an action-related body representation in our experiment, we included action verbs into our list 
of items. Hauk et al. (2004) had shown that reading action verbs describing limb-related 
actions activates areas in motor and premotor cortex that correspond to specific body parts. 
It has to be emphasized that studies of body structural description or body image have not 
applied tasks involving bodily actions or mental representations of actions triggered for 
example by action verbs, as in the paradigm used in our study.  
The finding that the results of our study are in concordance with results of previous studies 
regarding the role of congenital phantoms (Brugger et al. 2000; Brugger and Funk 2007; 
Funk et al. 2005; Funk and Brugger 2008) suggests that this representation of the body on 
the cognitive level might be mediated by knowledge structures comparable to the ones that 
underlie movement knowledge. This is supported by de Vignemont’s (2010) definition of 
body schema according to which body schema includes long-term and short-term body 
representations, representations of the body as an effectors and as the goal of an action, and 
is exploited by the motor system at the different stages of action programming, action 
prediction and sensory feedback to inform forward and inverse models in the motor control 
system.  
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Conclusion 
Lately, several authors have criticized the strict differentiation implied by the customary 
dyadic and triadic taxonomies of body representation. De Vignemont (2010) points out that 
action-based body schema and body image(s) “interact all the time”, whereas Carruthers 
(2008) proposes an alternative classification. Berlucchi and Aglioti (2010) argue against 
maintaining the terms body schema and body image and favour the conception of “many 
bodies in the brain” that are “unlikely to be isomorphic with the body itself”. De Vignemont et 
al. (2009) even provide evidence for a top-down influence of body part concepts on tactile 
integration. In the light of these statements and our previous studies of cognitive movement 
structures (Schack 2004a; Bläsing et al. 2009), we see the results of our study as evidence 
for a strong interaction of action-based and conceptual body representations on a functional 
level.  
Taking into account the influence of C.L.’s functional adaptation to his bodily condition and 
the modified modularity of body representation, we conclude that body representation might 
be strongly influenced by action concepts rather than by actions or concepts on different 
levels. This point, however, needs to be substantiated by further studies. Regarding A.Z., our 
results corroborate the findings of previous studies (e.g., Funk et al. 2005; Funk and Brugger 
2008) and add the aspect that her congenital phantoms maintain the modularity of her body 
representation in the same way as a complete body does, even if its functionality is impaired, 
as in the paralysed participants of our study. 
Finally, it has to be borne in mind, though, that with A.Z and C.L. two individuals have been 
included in the study that differ from others to a large extent and that generalisation even to 
other amelic individuals is a difficult issue. This might be especially true for A.Z., who as a 
tetramelic person with full congenital phantoms represents an extremely rare case.  
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